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SCRUTINIZING LEGACY ADMISSIONS: APPLYING TIERS OF SCRUTINY 
TO LEGACY PREFERENCE POLICIES IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS   
T. Liam Murphy*
INTRODUCTION   
Children of alumni, or legacy applicants, are as much as five times more 
likely to be admitted into prestigious universities than non-legacy applicants.1  
Legacy applicants receive an admissions advantage at 85% of the 150 most 
prestigious universities in the United States.2  These policies differ by 
university, but at the highest-ranked universities, legacy applicants receive a 
45% admissions advantage over non-legacy applicants.3   
This is a problem because legacy advantage policies decrease diversity 
and deny equality of opportunity.  In contrast to race-based advantage 
policies, the beneficiaries of legacy advantage policies are disproportionately 
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 1 See Delano R. Franklin & Samuel W. Zwickel, Legacy Admit Rate Five Times That of Non-Legacies, Court 
Docs Show, HARV. CRIMSON, June 20, 2018, https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/
6/20/admissions-docs-legacy/ (“The admission rate of legacy applicants is over five times that of 
non-legacy students . . . . ”).  
 2 See Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Shara L. Alpern, No Distinctions Except Those Which Merit 
Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 51, 129 (2009) (“Of [] 150 [top] schools, we were able to confirm that 102 grant legacy 
preferences . . . .”); Keith Powers, Legacy Admissions and Basic Fairness: The Wrong Way to Boost Students’ 
College Admissions Chances, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 6, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.nydaily
news.com/opinion/ny-oped-legacy-admissions-vs-fairness-20180904-story.html (“Roughly 75% 
of the country’s top 100 universities in the U.S. News and World Report use legacy preference 
when admitting students, as do nearly all of the top 100 liberal arts schools.”).  
 3 See Yoni Blumberg, Harvard’s Incoming Freshman Class Is One-Third Legacy—Here’s Why That’s a Problem, 
CNBC (Sept. 6, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/06/harvards-incoming-class-
is-one-third-legacy.html (noting that at the top thirty universities, legacy applicants receive a 45% 
advantage in admissions chances over non-legacy applicants). 
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wealthy and white.4  These demographics are already over-represented at 
prestigious universities,5 where students from families in the top 1% of wealth 
outnumber students from the entire bottom 60% of wealth.6  
Legacy advantage policies deny equality of opportunity by delegitimizing 
universities as a vehicle for social and economic mobility.7  Equal access to 
higher education plays a vital role in sustaining the legitimacy of equality of 
opportunity.8  Legacy advantage policies deter the advancement of children 
from low-income, low-education families, while simultaneously granting a 
benefit to children from high-income, high-education families.9  Until 
 
 4 See id. (“Legacy students tend to be wealthy and white, students who, as a group, are already 
disproportionately represented at college.”). 
 5 Id.; Daniella Silva, Study on Harvard Finds 43 Percent of White Students are Legacy, Athletes, Related to Donors 
or Staff, NBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019, 1:04 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/study-
harvard-finds-43-percent-white-students-are-legacy-athletes-n1060361. 
 6 See Yoni Blumberg, Harvard’s Incoming Freshman Class Is One-Third Legacy—Here’s Why That’s a Problem, 
CNBC (Sept. 6, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/06/harvards-incoming-class-
is-one-third-legacy.html (“The New York Times found that, at five Ivy League schools, Dartmouth, 
Princeton, Yale, Penn and Brown, as well as 33 other colleges, there are more students from families 
in the top one percent than from the entire bottom 60 percent.”).  
 7 See Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College 
Admissions, in AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCES 101, 117 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004) 
(“Higher education is the ‘great equalizer’ and must promote social and economic mobility.”). 
 8 See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 276 (1998) 
(admission to elite universities “is an exceedingly valuable resource-valuable both to the students 
admitted and to the society at large-which is why admissions need to be based ‘on the merits”); 
PETER SACKS, TEARING DOWN THE GATES: CONFRONTING THE CLASS DIVIDE IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 122 (2007) (“[Flor any nation that purports to uphold egalitarian and democratic 
values, it matters who is educated at these [elite] institutions.”).  See generally John K. Wilson, The 
Myth of Reverse Discrimination in Higher Education, 10 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 88, 93 (1995–96) 
(“[E]lite degrees are part of an intricate certification process that gives their recipients a huge 
advantage in the job market and a network of alums to help them.”). 
 9 One study found that more than 5,000 high schools nationwide had students that graduated with 
qualifications sufficient for admission to Harvard but did not have a single student apply there.  
Further, “[m]any of these 5,000 high schools with highly qualified students have a limited history 
of sending graduates to Harvard, and most have large numbers of economically disadvantaged 
students.”  Large Numbers of Highly Qualified, Low-Income Students Are Not Applying to Harvard and Other 
Highly Selective Schools, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (2006), www.jbhe.com/news_views/52_low-
income-students.html (explaining the results of a study that found academically strong students 
from low-income families are reluctant to apply to prestigious colleges like Harvard). 
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universities “re-examine their legacy policies and make substantive changes, 
diversity on a large scale will continue to be hindered.”10   
Recently, legacy advantage polices have received headlines resulting 
from a high-profile affirmative action case, Students for Fair Admissions v. 
Harvard.11  The legal question of this lawsuit was whether Harvard unlawfully 
discriminated against Asian-Americans in undergraduate admissions.12  
Richard Kahlenberg, author of the seminal book on legacy admissions, 
Affirmative Action for the Rich,13 testified for the Plaintiffs.14  Kahlenberg claimed 
that “socioeconomic diversity at Harvard is deeply lacking,” asserting that 
“there are up to 23 times as many rich students at Harvard as poor ones.”15  
The complaint alleged that legacy advantages “operate to the disadvantage 
of minority applicants.”16  The Harvard case was successful at highlighting 
the unfairness of legacy admissions.  However, the legal claims are limited to 
Harvard’s race-based preference policies and does not implicate legacy 
admissions.17 
Unlike race-based preference policies, the constitutionality of legacy 
preferences in university admissions has never been addressed by the 
Supreme Court.  But this may change.  Author of the Sixth Circuit’s 
landmark affirmative action opinion Grutter v. Bollinger,18 Judge Boyce Martin, 
Jr., recently said that “legacy admissions are problematic legally,” and that 
he “expect[s] legal challenges to the practice of legacy preferences, especially 
 
 10 Marybeth Gasman & Julie Vultaggio, Perspectives: A “Legacy” of Racial Injustice in American Higher 
Education, DIVERSE ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 22, 2008, https://diverseeducation.com/
article/10519/.  
 11  Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, No. 1:14-cv-14176-DJC (D. Mass. filed Nov. 17, 2014). 
 12 See Janelle Lawrence & Patricia Hurtado, Your Kid’s Legacy Admission May Be One Casualty of Harvard 
Trial, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
10-23/one-casualty-of-harvard-trial-may-be-your-kid-s-legacy-admission (discussing a lawsuit 
against Harvard that alleges that the college discriminates against Asian-Americans during 
undergraduate admissions).  
 13 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH, LEGACY 
PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 201 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010). 
 14 Lawrence & Hurtado, supra note 12 (noting that Richard Kahlenberg testified for the plaintiff in 
the lawsuit against Harvard which alleged that it discriminated against Asian-Americans during 
undergraduate admissions).  
 15 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16 Eric Hoover, Wait, Will Anyone Investigate Legacy Admissions?, CHRON.  HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 3, 2017, 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Wait-Will-Anyone-Investigate/240850.  
 17 See id. (explaining that Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard challenged “racial preferences,” not 
“legacy preferences”).  
 18 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
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at public universities such as the University of Virginia, to begin in the near 
future.”19 
Judge Martin, Jr. and other legal scholars have assumed that a legal 
challenge against legacy preference policies would arise under the Equal 
Protection Clause.20  The Supreme Court’s precedent on race-based 
preference policies makes clear that admissions decisions at public 
universities are subject to the Equal Protection Clause.21  The Civil Rights 
Act of 186622 extends this right to cover admissions decisions at private 
universities.23  When the constitutionality of a law is challenged under the 
Equal Protection Clause, courts will apply one of three levels of judicial 
scrutiny.   
This Comment analyzes legacy preference policies under the three levels 
of judicial scrutiny: strict, intermediate, and rational-basis review.  This 
Comment does not take a stance on which level of scrutiny a judge would 
apply when analyzing a challenge of a legacy preference policy.  Rather, this 
Comment takes an impartial stance on that question, and instead, explores 
 
 19 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 201. 
 20 See Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 52–53 (noting that legal commentators have 
generally believed that legacy admissions schemes are not prohibited under the Equal Protection 
Clause).  Legal scholars have also argued that legacy preferences in public universities violate the 
Constitution’s prohibition on granting titles of nobility.  See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of 
Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the Unconstitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1383 (2006) (arguing that legacy preference schemes violate the 
Constitution’s Nobility Clauses). 
 21 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270, 275–76 (2003) (striking down undergraduate admissions 
policy that gave an advantage to racial minorities solely because of race as violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause 
does not prohibit the [University of Michigan] Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in 
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow 
from a diverse student body.”).  
 22 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 
114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140).  The portion of this Act that we are concerned with—the prohibition 
on discrimination in the right “to make and enforce contracts”—is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (2010).  
 23 The Supreme Court has held that, given their common origins and purposes, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and the Equal Protection Clause should be construed in harmony with respect to 
discrimination based on race or ancestry.  See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948) (“[I]n many 
significant respects the [Civil Rights Act of 1866] and the [Fourteenth] Amendment were 
expressions of the same general congressional policy.”); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. 
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389–90 (1892) (“In light of the close connection between [the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and the Enforcement Act of 1870] and the [Fourteenth] Amendment, it would 
be incongruous to construe the principal object of their successor, § 1981, in a manner markedly 
different from that of the Amendment itself.”).  
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the strongest legal arguments for each standard of review applying to a case 
challenging the constitutionality of a legacy preference policy.  
I.  APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO LEGACY POLICIES  
Policies frequently involve making classifications that either advantage or 
disadvantage one group of persons, but not another.  For example, states 
allow twenty-year-olds to drive, but do not allow twelve-year-olds to.24  
Impoverished “single parents receive government financial aid that is denied 
to millionaires.”25  The Equal Protection Clause does not require policies to 
treat all persons exactly the same.26  Rather, a governmental policy is only 
obligated to treat people the same if they are similarly circumstanced.27  
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has developed a three-tiered 
approach to analyze whether a policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Policies that involve suspect classifications or classifications that burden 
fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.28  Strict scrutiny applies to 
cases of potential discrimination on the basis of suspect classifications like 
race,29 national origin,30 and ancestry,31 and to cases that impair fundamental 
 
 24 Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, EXPLORING CONST. CONFLICTS, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 25 Id.  
 26 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”).  
 27 The concept of “similarly situated” developed in doctrinal contexts other than equal protection and 
then entered the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in 1884.  See Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367–68 (1886) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause requires those 
who are “similarly situated” not be treated differently for an arbitrary reason). 
 28 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications, 
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing 
court under strict scrutiny.”).  
 29  See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (explaining that racial classifications are subject 
to “the most exacting scrutiny”). 
 30 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that racial classifications are “subject 
. . . to the most rigid scrutiny”), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2432 (2018).  
 31 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996) (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)) (noting 
that the Court has given heightened scrutiny to ancestry classification); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1991) (implying that the use of “classifications based on 
ancestry or skin color,” as they relate to the use of peremptory strikes in a civil suit, are 
presumptively unlawful); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (“[A] State’s 
distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens [cannot] hinge[] . . . on ancestry or the color of a 
person’s skin . . . . ”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 & n.4 (1976) (citing Oyama 
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rights.32  Under strict scrutiny, a policy will be sustained only if it involves a 
compelling objective and the classification is necessary to serve that 
objective.33  
Legacy preference policies make classifications between people based on 
whether an applicant’s parents attended that university.  A judge deciding to 
apply strict scrutiny to a legacy preference policy would likely face arguments 
that two different suspect classifications applied.  First, they could determine 
that legacy preference policies discriminate against applicants based on 
ancestry.  Second, they could determine that these policies discriminate 
against applicants based on race.  This Part explores both suspect 
classifications and identifies Supreme Court precedent that would be 
instructive to a judge deciding whether to analyze legacy preference policies 
under strict scrutiny.  
A.  The Ancestry Classification  
1.  Policies that discriminate on the basis of ancestry are subject to strict scrutiny  
The Supreme Court has long held that discrimination on the basis of 
“ancestry” is subject to strict scrutiny.34  This rule was first articulated over 
 
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)) (noting that ancestry is a suspect classification); Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 (1972) (noting that “certain classifications based on unalterable traits such 
as race and lineage are inherently suspect . . . . ”) (footnotes omitted); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 
475, 479 (1954) (“The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of 
their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (applying strict scrutiny to a policy that 
discriminated on the basis of the fundamental right to vote); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 
35 (1867) (applying strict scrutiny to a policy that discriminated on the basis of the fundamental 
right to travel freely). 
 33 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“In other words, [racial] classifications are constitutional only if 
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”). 
 34 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 629 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)) (noting that the Court 
has given heightened scrutiny to ancestry classification); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630–31 (implying 
that the use of “classifications based on ancestry or skin color,” as they relate to the use of 
peremptory strikes in a civil suit, are presumptively unlawful); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (“[A] State’s 
distribution of benefits or imposition of burden [cannot] hinge[] . . . on ancestry or the color of a 
person’s skin . . . . ”); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 & n.4 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 
(1948))  (noting that ancestry is a suspect classification); Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73 (noting that “certain 
classifications based on unalterable traits such as race and lineage are inherently suspect . . . . ”) 
(footnotes omitted); Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479 (holding that discrimination based on ancestry or 
national origin, as it relates to jury selection, is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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seventy-five years ago in Hirabayashi v. United States.35  The Court explained 
that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon 
the doctrine of equality.”36  The Court’s language in Hirabayashi  has been 
consistently quoted for the rule that a policy that discriminates on the basis 
of ancestry is subject to strict scrutiny.37 
A decade after Hirabayashi, the Court firmly articulated that 
discrimination on the basis of ancestry is prohibited by the Equal Protection 
Clause.38  In Hernandez v. Texas, the Texas system for selecting jurors by the 
use of jury commissions was found to be fair on its face but capable of being 
utilized for discrimination.39  The plaintiff in Hernandez was a person of 
Mexican descent, and he challenged his state conviction on the grounds that 
persons of similar Mexican ancestry had been purposely discriminated against 
in the selection of jurors in the county he was convicted.40  The Court held 
that the exclusion of eligible jurors on the basis of their ancestry was 
discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.41  In doing so, the 
 
 35 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their 
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”). 
 36 Id.; see also id. at 110 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly 
inconsistent with our traditions and ideals.”). 
 37 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007) 
(recognizing the holding established in Hirabayashi); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) 
(quoting the language from Hirabayashi directly); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 
613 (1987) (“Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who 
are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic 
characteristics.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting the general rule that 
discrimination based on ancestry has been “consistently repudiated”); Oyama v. California, 332 
U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (recognizing the general rule that discrimination on the basis of ancestry is 
“odious”).  
 38 See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479 (“The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely 
because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 39 Id. at 478–79 (“[T]he Texas system of selecting grand and petit jurors by the use of jury commissions 
is fair on its face and capable of being utilized without discrimination.  But as this Court has held, 
the system is susceptible to abuse and can be employed in a discriminatory manner.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 40 Id. at 476–77 (“[Petitioner] alleged that persons of Mexican descent were systematically excluded 
from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors, although there were such persons 
fully qualified to serve residing in [the county where petitioner was convicted].”) (footnote omitted). 
 41 Id. at 479 (“The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of their 
ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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Court cited Hirabayashi’s famous words and confirmed that strict scrutiny 
applies to policies that discriminate on the basis of ancestry.42 
The ancestry classification also applies to a case of private discrimination.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1981,43 prohibits discrimination based on ancestry.44  In Runyon v. McCrary, 
the Supreme Court held that the 1866 Act’s proscriptions apply to 
admissions discrimination in both public and private schools.45  The Court 
has also held that, given their common origins, the 1866 Act and the Equal 
Protection Clause should be construed in harmony with respect to 
discrimination based on race or ancestry.46   
The Supreme Court has held that the 1866 Act prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of ancestry.47  In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court held 
that an American born in Iraq could claim that he was unlawfully 
 
 42 Id. at 478 n.4 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
 43 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 
114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140).  The portion of this Act that we are concerned with—the prohibition 
on discrimination in the right “to make and enforce contracts”—is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (2010).  
 44 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (“Based on the history of § 1981, 
we have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination 
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their 
ancestry . . . . ”); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1976) (holding that § 1981 prohibits 
racially discriminatory admissions procedures at private schools). 
 45 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176–77 (holding that the 1866 Act’s proscriptions apply to the admission 
decisions of private schools); see also Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted in 
the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 
U.S. 701, 735 (1989) (acknowledging that the proscriptions set forth in the 1866 Act apply to state 
actors by way of the Fourteenth Amendment); Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613 (implying that the 
proscriptions of the 1866 Act can apply to private schools by way of § 1981); see, e.g., Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (concluding that a law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in 
admissions decisions did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Doe v. Kamehameha 
Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that 
racial preferences in admissions criteria for private school did not violate § 1981). 
 46 See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S., 375, 389–90 (1982) (“In light of the 
close connection between [the 1866 Act and the 1870 Act] and the Amendment, it would be 
incongruous to construe the principal object of their successor, § 1981, in a manner markedly 
different from that of the Amendment itself.”) (footnote omitted); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 
(1948) (“[I]n many significant respects the [1866 Act] and the Amendment were expressions of the 
same general congressional policy.”).  
 47 Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613.  In Al-Khazraji, plaintiff, a United States citizen born in Iraq, was a 
professor who was denied tenure by defendant college. Id. at 606.  He sued on the ground that the 
denial of tenure was based on “national origin, religion, and/or race.”  Id.  The district court had 
entered summary judgment against plaintiff on the ground that discrimination based on Arabian 
ancestry is not “race” discrimination actionable under the Act.  Id. 
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discriminated against if he was “subjected to intentional discrimination based 
on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation 
of his origin, or his religion.”48  The Court did not require that the class 
identifier be physical or ethnic characteristics, like race,49 but rather 
confirmed that discrimination on the basis of ancestry violates both the 1866 
Act and the Equal Protection Clause.50  
Since Hirabayashi, the Court has confirmed that both private and public 
policies that discriminate on the basis of ancestry violate the 1866 Act and 
the Equal Protection Clause, unless they are able to withstand strict 
scrutiny.51  Following precedent, a judge will find that policies that 
discriminate on the basis of ancestry are subject to strict scrutiny.  In the 
context of legacy preference policies, the open question will involve the scope 
of the ancestry classification and whether discrimination on the basis of 
family lineage, as opposed to ethnic lineage, is within the scope of the 
ancestry classification.  The following section explores this question.  
2.  Whether discrimination on the basis of family lineage is within the scope of the 
ancestry classification.  
The scope of the ancestry classification has not been fully resolved.  A 
judge could plausibly read the Supreme Court’s ancestry precedent as only 
encompassing discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic groups.  
However, some legal scholars have argued that the reasoning of the Court’s 
ancestry precedent suggests that discrimination on the basis of family lineage 
falls within the ancestry classification.52  Specifically, some legal scholars 
argue that the Court’s decision in Oyama v. California53 “made clear that the 
prohibited ‘ancestry’ distinctions include those based on individual family 
 
 48 Id. at 613. 
 49 Id.  (“[A] distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for . . . protection.”).  Thus, an identifier 
based on family lineage, such as a listing in the Social Register or Burke’s Peerage & Gentry, should 
suffice.  In the case of discrimination against the children of non-alumni, the class is identified by 
consulting the applicant’s answer to the family lineage question asked on the application form.   
 50 Id. at 613 & n.5 (noting that discrimination based on ancestry violates § 1981 and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 51 See supra Part I.A. 
 52 Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 102–03. 
 53 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (holding that certain provisions of the Alien 
Land Laws cannot abridge the rights of citizens merely because of their ancestry). 
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lineage–on the identity or status of one’s parents–in addition to those based 
on racial or ethnic group.”54 
The Court’s decision in Oyama can be plausibly read to include 
discrimination on the basis of family lineage as included in the suspect 
ancestry classification.  In Oyama, the statute at issue prohibited illegal 
immigrants, who were ineligible for American citizenship, from transferring 
land.55  The father bought agricultural land for his son, Fred Oyama, who 
was a minor and an American citizen.56  The statute prevented the father 
from transferring land to his son, because he was an illegal immigrant and 
ineligible for American citizenship.57  
The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection 
Clause, because it discriminated against an American minor whose parents 
could not be naturalized.58  Under the statute, an American minor whose 
parents were either American citizens or eligible for naturalization would not 
be barred from the ability to receive land.59  As the Court stated, “the father’s 
deeds were visited on the sons.”60  This disparate treatment to minor citizens 
whose parents could not be naturalized, deprived the son, Fred Oyama, 
equal protection of the law.61  
The discrimination against Fred Oyama has been described as being 
based on “national origin,” but some legal scholars argue that the holding 
should be read to prohibit a broader form of discrimination based on “family 
lineage.”62  Those scholars argue that type of discrimination Fred Oyama 
faced was not based on national origin, because his nation of origin was the 
United States.63  The discrimination was not based on Fred Oyama’s nation 
of origin, but rather, it was based on his father’s nation of origin.  Therefore, 
these scholars argue that the discrimination was based on family lineage–the 
status or conduct of his parents.64  
 
 54 Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 102–03. 
 55 Oyama, 332 U.S. at 635–36. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 639 n.16. 
 59 Id. at 643, 646–47. 
 60 Id. at 643. 
 61 Id. at 641, 647. 
 62 Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 103–04. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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In the same year as Oyama, the Court articulated the scope of the ancestry 
classification to arguably cover family lineage in the context of education.  In 
Plyler v. Doe, the Court found that a Texas law, which denied free public 
education to children who could not prove that they had been lawfully 
admitted into the United States, was subject to heightened scrutiny.65  The 
classification was applicable because “the children who are plaintiffs in these 
cases ‘can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status,’”66 and, 
“no child is responsible for his [or her] birth.”67  Although the children were 
themselves unlawfully present in the country, denying a free education to 
them “poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: 
the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to 
advancement on the basis of individual merit.”68 
The Court’s dicta in a variety of cases could also be instructive in 
determining the scope of the ancestry classification.  In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
Justice Stewart, in dissent, stated that the Equal Protection Clause “promised 
to carry to its necessary conclusion a fundamental principle upon which this 
Nation had been founded—that the law would honor no preference based 
on lineage.”69  In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, in dissent, stated that “[s]tatus of birth, like the color of 
 
 65 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (finding that a state law that required children to prove lawful 
admission into the United States to receive free public education was subject to heightened 
scrutiny).   
 66 Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)); see also id. at 223 (legislation 
affected “a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status”). 
 67 Id. at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).   
 68 Id. at 221–22.  In a concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), Justice Brennan 
noted that “equality of citizenship is of the essence in our Republic,” Id. at 70, and that, “[t]he 
American aversion to aristocracy developed long before the Fourteenth Amendment and is, of 
course, reflected elsewhere in the Constitution.”  Id. at 69 n.3 (citing the Nobility Clause).  Rather 
than paying homage to ancestry or lineage, the Constitution “requires attention to individual merit, 
to individual need.”  Id. at 70.  In Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985), the 
Court quoted Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Zobel for the proposition that, “the Citizenship 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of 
citizenship based on length of residence. And the Equal Protection Clause would not tolerate such 
distinctions.’”  Id. at 623 n.14 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)).  See generally Mark 
G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1394 (1990) (“Arbitrariness lies in classifying persons in 
accordance with their birthrights (slave status) or other characteristics (race) over which they have 
little or no control; a reasonable classification takes into account their wills, the things they are able 
to choose to do or not do within the limits of their capacities and the social order.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 69 448 U.S. 448, 531 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).  
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one’s skin, is something which the individual cannot control, and should 
generally be irrelevant in legislative considerations . . . .  Hence, 
discrimination on the basis of birth—particularly when it affects innocent 
children—warrants special judicial consideration.”70  Justices Breyer, Souter, 
and Ginsburg, writing for themselves, in Miller v. Albright, confirmed that 
“[t]his Court, I assume, would use heightened scrutiny were it to review 
discriminatory laws based upon ancestry, say, laws that denied voting rights 
or educational opportunity based upon the religion, or the racial makeup, of 
a parent or grandparent.”71  Given that a child need not have the same 
religion as her parent or grandparent, Justice Breyer’s language could be 
read to include discrimination on the basis of family lineage as eliciting strict 
scrutiny.72 
3.  Legacy preference policies discriminate on the basis of family lineage.  
If a judge finds that discrimination on the basis of family lineage is within 
the scope of the suspect ancestry classification, then it is likely that legacy 
preference policies would be subject to strict scrutiny.  Like the 
discrimination in Oyama, the discrimination of legacy preference policies is 
 
 70 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 476 (1998) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This Court, I assume, would use heightened scrutiny were it to review 
discriminatory laws based upon ancestry, say, laws that denied voting rights or educational 
opportunity based upon the religion, or the racial makeup, of a parent or grandparent.”); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (“That concept [race based classification] is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon 
the individual and its rejection of disposition based on race or based on blood.”) (citations omitted); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[H]uman equality is closely associated with the proposition that differences in 
color or creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in which persons should 
be treated.”).  The dissenter in Korematsu v. United States had earlier made clear that the proscription 
on discrimination based on “ancestry” is not confined to racial or ethnic groups. 323 U.S. 214, 243 
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2432 (2018).  Justice 
Jackson concluded that Korematsu was entitled to be judged on his own merits rather than on who 
his parents were or what they might have done.  Id.   
 71 Miller, 523 U.S. at 476 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  None of the other opinions of a badly fractured 
Court reached this issue.  Nor did any of the opinions in a subsequent case that addressed the same 
statute.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 72 See also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 30 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that state tax 
exemption for children of homeowner parents denies equal protection because it “establishes a 
privilege of a medieval character” by “treat[ing] [families] differently solely because of their 
different heritage”).  The majority upheld the statute in Nordlinger because only the rational basis 
test applies to State tax statutes, and review of exemptions to such statutes is especially deferential.  
Id. at 11–12.  Moreover, the plaintiff did not assert that the heredity discrimination required 
heightened scrutiny.  See id. at 10–11. 
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based on the status and conduct of the applicant’s parents.  An applicant 
whose parents did not attend any university would be discriminated against 
at all universities based on his or her parent’s status.  Further, even if an 
applicant’s parents did attend college in the United States, the applicant 
would still be discriminated against at every other university to which they 
apply if there is a legacy preference policy in place.  
In the alternative, it is entirely possible that legacy preference policies 
could be found unconstitutional even under the national origin test if the case 
comes under certain facts.  An applicant whose parents did not attend college 
in the United States, because they were born in another part of the world, 
would be discriminated against based on his or her parent’s nation of origin.  
Because the applicant’s parents did not attend a school in the United States 
due to their national origin, there would be no university that the applicant 
would receive an admissions advantage at.  Thus, it is likely that under the 
right set of facts, a judge could find that legacy policies discriminate based on 
ancestry, and accordingly, are subject to strict scrutiny.  
B.  The Race Classification   
1.  Policies that discriminate on the basis of race are subject to strict scrutiny.  
Policies that discriminate on the basis of race are subject to strict 
scrutiny.73  When a statute does not explicitly make racial distinctions, a 
judge must find that the policy is motivated by a discriminatory purpose.74  
Although it is without question that legacy policies were initially 
implemented to purposefully discriminate.75  Today, it is unlikely that a judge 
would find that legacy policies purposefully discriminate on the basis of race.  
 
 73 The Supreme Court held that all race-based classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 
U.S. 547 (1990), which had briefly allowed the use of intermediate scrutiny to analyze the Equal 
Protection implications of race-based classifications in the narrow category of affirmative-action 
programs established by the Federal Government in the broadcasting field. 
 74 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding that laws that have a racially discriminatory 
effect but were not adopted to advance a racially discriminatory purpose are valid under the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 75 See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
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However, legal scholars have argued that legacy policies have a disparate 
racial impact on non-white university applicants.76  
Additionally, the Court’s reasoning in its race discrimination 
jurisprudence could be extended to encompass discrimination based on 
birth-status.  If a judge did find this to be the case, the race and ancestry 
discrimination cases would be instructive in analyzing legacy preference 
policies under strict scrutiny.  Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Regents 
of University of California v. Bakke, held that race discrimination is subject to 
strict scrutiny because the Equal Protection Clause protects “every person 
regardless of his background,”77 and “a State’s distribution of benefits or 
imposition of burdens [cannot] hinge[] on ancestry or the color of a person’s 
skin.”78  Justice Brennan’s separate opinion agreed that, “human equality is 
closely associated with the proposition that differences in color or creed, birth 
or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in which persons 
should be treated.”79  
Additionally, in Rice v. Cayetano80 the Court held that the State of Hawaii 
violated the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on race-based voting qualifications 
by limiting the franchise to persons with “native Hawaiian” ancestry.  Racial 
discrimination is unlawful in large part because it is a type of discrimination 
based on ancestry or lineage:  
One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is 
that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry 
instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.  An inquiry into 
ancestral lines is not consistent with respect based on the unique personality 
 
 76 Steve D. Shadowen, Personal Dignity, Equal Opportunity, and the Elimination of Legacy Preferences, 21 CIV. 
RTS. L.J. 31, 61 n.148 (2010). 
 77 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) and Missouri ex rel. Gaines 
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938)).  In his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan 
wrote that race discrimination is unlawful because “[t]he humblest is the peer of the most powerful.  
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his 
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.”  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 78 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.  
 79 Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  See also id. at 360–61 (requiring 
strict scrutiny when a State decision is based on “an immutable characteristic which its possessors 
are powerless to escape or set aside”).  
 80 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).  
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each of us possesses, a respect the Constitution itself secures in its concern 
for persons and citizens.81 
The Court’s language in both Bakke and Cayetano could be interpreted by 
a judge to argue that racial discrimination based on birth-status is subject to 
strict scrutiny.  If this were the case, a judge then must determine whether 
legacy preference policies had a discriminatory effect on non-white races 
based on birth-status.  An explanation of the history of legacy preferences 
and the current racial makeup of legacy students is instructive in answering 
this question.  
2.  Historically, legacy policies were founded on racial discrimination.  
Legacy policies originated in the 1920s at the most prestigious East Coast 
universities.  During this era, many universities increased their selectivity due 
to increasing enrollments following World War I.82  This era also coincided 
with an increase in nationalism, which resulted in anti-immigrant and anti-
Jewish sentiments.83  The East Coast universities were concerned about their 
increased Jewish enrollments, and they addressed the concerns of over-
enrollment by implementing mechanisms—like legacy preference policies—
to exclude Jewish applicants.84 
The anti-Jewish sentiment of these legacy preference policies was explicit 
during this decade.  Harvard’s President Lowell was determined to limit the 
 
 81 Id. at 517; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 
(2007) (quoting this passage from Rice); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531 & n.13 (1980) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (The Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause “set out to establish a society 
that recognized no distinctions among white men on account of their birth” and “promised to carry 
to its necessary conclusion a fundamental principle upon which this Nation had been founded—
that the law would honor no preference based on lineage.”).  
 82 See MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTT, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND 
ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON, 1900–1970, at 154 (1979) (discussing the 
relationship between anti-Jewish sentiment and admissions restrictions at Yale and, more generally, 
other elite universities); see also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987) 
(holding that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, plaintiffs cannot solely show the defendant perceived them 
to be a separate race, but must in fact be one of the racial classifications Congress intended to 
protect under the statute); DAN A. OREN, JOINING THE CLUB: A HISTORY OF JEWS AND YALE 40 
(2d ed. 2000) (analyzing how restrictions on Jewish enrollment may be considered racial 
discrimination, if Jews were considered a separate race at the time the policy was implemented). 
 83 SYNNOTT, supra note 82, at 154.  
 84 Id.; see also Kathryn Ladewski, Note, Preserving a Racial Hierarchy: A Legal Analysis of the Disparate Racial 
Impact of Legacy Preferences in University Admissions, 108 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580 (2010) (describing the 
ways East Coast universities developed mechanisms in the 1920s to exclude Jewish applicants). 
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number of Jewish students, either through a quota or explicitly higher 
academic standards for Jewish Students.85  In 1925, President Lowell 
explained that the purpose of legacy policies was “to prevent a dangerous 
increase in the proportion of Jews.”86  Although other prestigious universities 
were not as explicit, Yale’s plan to address its increasing enrollment of Jewish 
students resulted in the nation’s first legacy admissions preference in 1925.87  
Soon after implementing this policy, Yale decreased its percentage of Jewish 
students and doubled the percentage of legacy students.88  
In the 1960s, legacy acceptance rates were further increased, potentially 
as a tool to discriminate against Black applicants.89   
[A]s pressure toward racial integration intensified, acceptance rates rapidly 
increased for children of alumni—in some cases, to as much as three times 
higher than that of the past.  Given resistance on the part of historically 
White institutions to enrolling Black students during the civil rights era, 
legacy policies may have furnished an excuse to reject racial minorities 
without resorting to the quotas that had been used exclude Jews and 
Catholics earlier in the century.90  
Although the nation’s first legacy preference policies were racially 
motivated, universities today justify their legacy preferences based on 
nondiscriminatory reasons, such as maintaining alumni donations.  
However, legacy preference policies still have a racially discriminatory effect 
that a judge could find is analogous to that of Yale and Harvard’s original, 
intentionally discriminatory legacy policies.  This racially discriminatory 
effect is explored in the following sub-section.  
 
 85 See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION 
AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 86–109 (2005) (describing the lengths these universities 
went to exclude Jewish applicants); see also OREN, supra note 82, at 49–52. 
 86 See id.; see also ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING THE PLAYING 
FIELD: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 83–84 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
2004) (discussing the introduction of legacy preferences at Dartmouth in 1922). 
 87 OREN, supra note 82 (explaining that the preference ensured that the “limitation on numbers shall 
not operate to exclude any son of a Yale graduate who has satisfied all the requirements for 
admission.”);  FULLINWIDER, supra note 86, at 84.  
 88 See OREN, supra note 82, at 116. 
 89 Marybeth Gasman & Julie Vultaggio, Perspectives: A “Legacy” of Racial Injustice in American Higher 
Education, DIVERSE ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 22, 2008, https://diverseeducation.com/
article/10519/.  
 90 Id.  
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3.  The racial impact of legacy preferences.   
White students disproportionately benefit from legacy preferences.91  For 
example, at Harvard, the new incoming class is about one-third legacy, and 
of that third, approximately 98% are white.92  Legacy preferences at most 
universities have been described by legal scholars as “near-perfect prox[ies] 
for being white.”93   
The disproportionate benefit of legacy preference for white applicants 
not only grants a benefit on them, but also perpetuates this benefit onto 
future white applicants.  Legacy policies improve admissions prospects for 
predominately white alumni children.  This leads to their white children 
receiving a benefit from these policies.  Because legacy preferences benefit 
children of alumni, “[t]he racial and ethnic composition of the pool of 
potential legacy students necessarily resembles the composition of past 
student generations.”94  Therefore, not only do legacy preference policies 
disproportionately benefit white students today, these policies also perpetuate 
this cycle of giving an admissions advantage to white children of alumni.   
II. APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO LEGACY POLICIES AS 
CLASSIFICATIONS BY PARENTAL STATUS  
The Supreme Court also applies a middle-tier intermediate scrutiny to 
discriminatory classifications that do not rise to the level of strict scrutiny.  
Under intermediate scrutiny, a policy will be sustained if it involves an 
important objective and the classification is substantially related to that 
objective.95  Intermediate scrutiny applies to cases of potential discrimination 
 
 91 See id. (“Because legacy admits are typically wealthy, White, fourth-generation college students, they 
offer little to colleges and universities in terms of racial and ethnic diversity.  In fact, according to 
multiple sources, over 90 percent of legacy admits are White Protestants.  Thus, legacy admits 
systematically reproduce a culture of racial and economic privilege.”). 
 92 Ginger O’Donnell, Challenging Legacy Admissions, INSIGHT INTO DIVERSITY (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.insightintodiversity.com/challenging-legacy-admissions/. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies in Black and White: The Racial Composition of the Legacy 
Pool, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 346 (2004). 
 95 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory 
classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”).  
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on the basis of gender96 or illegitimacy.97  The intermediate scrutiny test has 
been applied unpredictably, and some scholars believe that the result of 
applying this test can depend on the values and perspectives of the judges 
applying it.98 
A judge could find that legacy admissions should be reviewed under 
intermediate scrutiny because, as is the case with children born to unmarried 
parents, “no child is responsible for his birth.”99  Thus, to penalize a child’s 
ability to get into a school based on whether their parent was able to get in, 
especially if that parent was unable to get in because of previous 
discrimination on the basis of race or religion, would be unjust to the child 
because they have no control over this status.100  
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Court held that a state could 
not lawfully prevent such children from recovering workers’ compensation 
death benefits.101  Discrimination against children based on their parents’ 
status elicits heightened scrutiny because “legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing,” and “no child is 
responsible for his birth.”102  The Equal Protection Clause “enable[s] us to 
strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth.”103   
Similarly, in Mathews v. Lucas104 the Court applied heightened scrutiny to 
a federal statute that required out-of-wedlock children to meet additional 
proof requirements in order to obtain survivor insurance benefits, because 
the statute used “a characteristic determined by causes not within the control 
 
 96 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males 
and females are ‘subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.’”).  
 97 Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny . . . has been applied to discriminatory 
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”).  
 98 In Craig v. Boren, the Court invalidated a law that banned the sale of 3.2% beer to eighteen to twenty-
year-old males while allowing purchase by females of the same age.  429 U.S. 190 (1976).  The 
same test resulted in a decision in 1981 upholding a California law that allowed males, but not 
females, to be charged with statutory rape.  Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).  
Taken together, the two cases suggest the unpredictability of the intermediate scrutiny test used by 
the Court.  
 99 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).  
 100 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY 
PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 201 (2010) (explaining how the demographics of the 
alumni applicants will take several generations to change). 
 101 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).  
 102 Id. at 175. 
 103 Id. at 176.  
 104 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).  
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of the . . . [child], and it bears no relation to the individual’s ability to 
participate in and contribute to society.”105 
Agreeing that heightened scrutiny was required, but disagreeing that the 
statute survived such scrutiny, Justice Stevens dissented because the 
government must be “especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of 
birth.”106  He noted that the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution’s prohibition on titles of nobility “equally would prohibit the 
United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at birth.”107 
However, to be a quasi-suspect classification, the judge would have to 
find that there was a history of discrimination against persons of that legal 
status, however the judge defines it.  A “badge of identification” is not 
required, like that which makes obvious a person’s race or gender.108   
III.  APPLYING RATIONAL BASIS TO LEGACY POLICIES  
If the legacy preference policy is found to not fall within the ancestry, 
race, or parental status classifications, then it will be analyzed under rational 
basis review.  Rational basis scrutiny applies to all cases that do not receive 
intermediate or strict scrutiny.  Under rational basis scrutiny, a policy will be 
sustained if it involves a legitimate government objective, and the 
classification is reasonably related to achieving that objective.109  Courts have 
 
 105 Id. at 505; see also Trimple v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) (explaining that heightened scrutiny 
is required because out-of-wedlock children “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own 
status”).  
 106 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 520 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 107 Id.; see also Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9, 13 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that proscription on titles of 
nobility prevents out-of-wedlock child from “being treated by her government as a second-class 
person”).  Discrimination against out-of-wedlock children has been subjected to heightened 
scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, only because that status is often entangled with the State’s 
interest in ensuring proof of paternity.  See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Reed v. 
Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97 (1982).  
 108 Id.  
 109 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (“[S]cheme must still be 
examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
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found that rational basis review applies to cases of age110 and disability111 
discrimination. 
The rational basis test is very deferential and nearly all policies analyzed 
under this standard are found to be constitutional.  In FCC v. Beach,112 the 
Court went so far as to say that economic regulations satisfy the equal 
protection requirement if “there is any conceivable”  fact pattern that could 
provide a rational basis for the classification.  Justice Stevens, concurring, 
objected to the Court’s test, arguing that it is “tantamount to no review at 
all.”113 
The only federal court that has addressed what level of review applies to 
legacy preferences held that rational basis review was the applicable test.114  
In Rosenstock v. Board of Governors of University of North Carolina, Judge Hiram 
Ward of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina applied the rational basis test, because the Supreme Court had 
found that the right to a university education was not a fundamental interest, 
and he found that children of alumni are not a suspect criteria.115  The issue 
in Rosenstock was whether the university’s policy of preferential treatment of 
out-of-state applicants who are the sons or daughters of alumni constitute a 
denial of plaintiff’s right to equal protection of the laws.  Applying rational 
review, Judge Ward held that the University of North Carolina’s legacy 
preference policy survived rational review because “defendants showed that 
alumni provide monetary support for the University and that out-of-state 
alumni contribute close to one-half of the total given.”116  The court further 
said, “[t]o grant children of this latter group a preference then is a reasonable 
basis and is not constitutionally defective.”117  
Decided in 1976, Rosenstock is non-binding, non-persuasive, and will likely 
not be followed.  First, this case is not binding on any court, because it was 
 
 110 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (applying the rational basis test to age 
discrimination because there is not a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” based on age and 
“old age does not define a discrete and insular minority” because all persons experience all ages if 
they live out their normal lifespans).  
 111 Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (holding that if special accommodations are to 
be required for the disabled, then they must come from positive law, not from the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  
 112 FCC v. Beach, 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 113 Id. at 323. 
 114 Rosenstock v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 423 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (M.D.N.C. 1976). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id. 
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decided by a federal district court.  Second, it is not persuasive, because it 
does not provide any reasoning that will be instructive to future courts.  Judge 
Ward concludes that strict scrutiny does not apply to legacy policies in a mere 
five sentences, but in doing so, the court never explains its reasoning for why 
various classifications do not apply.  Additionally, the facts in Rosenstock were 
not ideal for a challenge to legacy policies.  The plaintiff was a white student, 
whose ancestors were from America, and she likely did not have the 
credentials for the university she applied to.  Finally, this case will likely not 
be followed, because it was decided over forty years ago.  In the last four 
decades, the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has drastically 
changed, including the clear articulation of the three standards of review.  
For these reasons, Rosenstock will likely not factor into a court’s decision on 
what standard of review to apply.  
Potentially more important is Justice Clarence Thomas’s partial dissent 
in Grutter v. Bollinger.118  In his partial dissent to this landmark affirmative 
action case, Justice Thomas stated that the Constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause did not prohibit “unseemly legacy preferences,” because they did not 
directly involve race.119  He further stated that “legacy preferences can stand 
under the Constitution.”120  In a footnote, Justice Thomas further weighed 
in on legacy preferences and said, “[w]ere this court to have the courage to 
forbid the use of racial discrimination in admissions legacy preferences (and 
similar practices) might quickly become less popular—a possibility not lost, I 
am certain, on the elites (both individual and institutional) supporting the 
Law School in this case.”121 
Like Judge Ward’s decision in Rosenstock, Justice Thomas’s partial dissent 
is neither binding nor persuasive for a judge determining which standard of 
review to analyze a legacy policy under.  Justice Thomas’s partial dissent 
does, however, shed light on his perspective of this issue.  As the only 
Supreme Court justice to weigh in on this question, rational basis review very 
well might be the standard of review that will be applied.  Thus, it is likely 
that Justice Thomas would agree with the Judge Ward’s opinion, and he 
would likewise apply rational review because legacy preferences do not 
directly involve race. 
 
 118 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 119 Id. at 369; see also Adam Liptak, A Hereditary Perk the Founding Fathers Failed to Anticipate, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 15, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/us/15bar.html. 
 120 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369. 
 121 Id. at 368 n.10. 
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IV. THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST  
After determining what level of scrutiny a challenged legacy policy would 
be evaluated under, a judge would then weigh the governmental interest 
furthered by the legacy preference policies.  This section discusses three 
governmental interest that a judge would use to evaluate whether the legacy 
policy survives review.  First, there is a compelling governmental interest in 
maintaining student-body diversity at prestigious universities.  In the Court’s 
affirmative action jurisprudence, the issue of student-body diversity was a 
compelling enough interest to sustain some amount of race-based affirmative 
action.  Evidence strongly supports the contention that legacy policies harm 
the racial diversity of universities’ student bodies.122    
The universities may argue that legacy preferences survive strict scrutiny, 
because legacy status is only one of numerous factors in an individualized 
review of each application, just as was approved in Grutter.123  This argument 
fails, because it bypasses the first step of identifying the university’s interest.  
In Grutter, the preference in favor of otherwise under-represented racial 
minorities served the school’s interest in achieving student body diversity.124 
Grutter asserts that “nothing less than the ‘nation’s future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as 
diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”125  Accordingly, “attaining a diverse 
student body is at the heart of the [university’s] proper institutional 
mission.”126  Student-body diversity also promotes good citizenship and 
stabilizes society by ensuring that “all members of our heterogenous society 
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational 
institutions that provide this training.”127 
 
 122 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 123 See generally Id.  In Grutter, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious 
admissions policy.  Id.  The Court held that the policy was subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, that the school had a compelling interest in obtaining a diverse student body, 
and that the means of achieving that goal were appropriately narrow because race was only one 
factor in a holistic evaluation of each application.  Id. 
 124 Id. at 343. 
 125 Id. at 324 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring)).  
 126 Id. at 329. 
 127 Id. at 332; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 834 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing strict scrutiny is necessary when government uses race “to 
decide who will receive goods or services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and 
which are in short supply”). 
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Second, those in favor of legacy preference policies will argue, as they did 
in Rosenstock, that universities have an interest in raising money.  They will 
argue that legacy preference policies increase alumni donations.  This 
argument is often assumed to be correct; however, a statistical analysis of 
alumni contributions at top schools shows that there is no evidence of 
causation between an increase in alumni donations and legacy preference 
policies.128   
Those defending these polices argue that they increase university 
revenue.129  There are two problems with this argument.  First, there has 
never been an empirical analysis that proves a causation between legacy 
preferences and increased revenue.  Second, profiting from discrimination is 
unlawful.130   
Universities will not be able to meet their burden to establish causation 
between legacy preferences and increased university revenue.131  A recent 
study performed an analysis of the effects of legacy preferences on private 
giving and found no statistically significant relationship.132  The study 
surveyed the top seventy-five national universities and top seventy-five liberal 
arts colleges as ranked in the 2007 edition of U.S. News & World Report.133  
Of the 150 schools, the study was able to confirm that 102 grant legacy 
preference and seventeen do not; of the latter, eight stopped granting legacy 
preferences within the past fifteen years.134  The database included alumni 
giving rates from 1992 to 2006.135  The data showed no statistically 
significant correlation between legacy preferences and alumni giving.136  
Further, of the eight universities that have recently terminated legacy 
preferences, seven experienced an increase in donations.137 
 
 128 Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 129–32.  
 129 Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies in Black and White: The Racial Composition of the Legacy 
Pool, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 330 (2004) (arguing the purpose of preferences is “to keep . . . 
alumni happy—and donating”). 
 130 Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 125–26.  
 131 See, e.g., Kathrin Lassila, Why Yale Favors its Own, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2004, 
http://archives.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2004_11/q_a.html. 
 132 Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 129–32.  
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
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Finally, even if a defendant-university is able to show a causation between 
donations and legacy preferences.  Profiting from discrimination is not a 
legitimate government interest.  The law cannot recognize the receipt of 
revenue from the discrimination’s beneficiaries—here, alumni students—as 
a legitimate interest.138  For example, the Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas could not have justified its racially segregated schools by asserting 
that the white parents would have been more amenable to tax increases if 
the schools remained all white.139  Similarly, in Plyler v. Doe, the State of Texas 
tried to justify the denial of a free education to undocumented children by 
pointing to the need to preserve scarce funds for the education of lawful 
residents.140  The Supreme Court found that Texas’s justification was not a 
lawful government interest.141   
Additionally, legacy preference policies are not narrowly tailored to the 
goal of increasing revenue.  The universities’ purported interest here is simply 
in raising revenue, which can easily be done without discriminating based on 
lineage.  They can obtain additional government funding, use their 
endowments, increase private fundraising efforts, and cut administrative 
expenses.142   
CONCLUSION  
Legacy preferences in college admissions infringe fundamental American 
values.  Preferring the applications of alumni children gives them a 
substantial benefit based not on merit, but on the identity, status, and 
accomplishments of their parents.  Although legacy preference policies 
infringe these fundamental values, it is unclear whether they are 
constitutional.  If this case came before a judge it would be an issue of first 
impression.  Because of the nature of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, 
the constitutionality of a legacy preference policy would depend on what level 
 
 138 Id. at 125–26. 
 139 Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 140 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982) (holding that denying undocumented residents’ children 
access to public education). 
 141 Id.  (“[A] concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification 
used in allocating those resources.”).  To assert that denial of a benefit to the disfavored class will 
save resources is simply to “justify . . . classification with a concise expression of an intention to 
discriminate.”  Id.; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (holding the saving of 
welfare costs by invidious discrimination of aliens is unconstitutional). 
 142 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 n.25.  
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of review a judge decides to analyze the policy under.  The judge’s decision 
will turn greatly on the facts.  The impact of what standard of review to apply 
could be the difference between the continued discrimination against non-
rich, non-white individuals from the nation’s top institutions, and the end to 
this meritless system that has discriminated against those most vulnerable 
since its racist founding.  
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